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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2014, the retailer Neiman Marcus revealed it was the target of a 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2019; B.A., 
History, University of California, Los Angeles, 2013. First of all, thank you to my friends and family, especially 
Hayley Graves, for their continued guidance, support, and encouragement. I also thank Professor Dajani for his 
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data breach affecting over one million customers’ credit and debit cards.1 
Hackers had installed malware on payment terminals and stole customers’ 
payment card information over a two-and-a-half month period.2 Investigators 
found fraudulent usage on thousands of credit and debit cards accessed in the 
breach.3 
In March 2014, Hilary Remijas, an affected Neiman Marcus customer, sued 
the retailer in a class action lawsuit over the data breach.4 The complaint’s 
allegations included breach of implied contract and violation of data breach 
laws.5 Their alleged harm included fraudulent charges, the increased risk of 
identity theft due to the exposure of their private information, and time spent 
monitoring financial accounts to watch for potential identity theft.6 
A federal district judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2014 for lack of Article III 
standing.7 However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
held the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing.8 The Seventh Circuit found the 
increased risk of identity theft and the time and effort to protect against that risk 
conferred standing.9 With the lawsuit allowed to continue, Neiman Marcus 
ultimately settled for 1.6 million dollars in 2017.10 
The grocery store chain SuperValu faced a similar situation to Neiman 
Marcus when a hacker broke into the chain’s databases and stole customers’ 
payment card information.11 Similar to Remijas, affected SuperValu customers 
brought class action suits alleging tort and contract claims and violation of state 
consumer protection and data breach notification laws.12 Also like Remijas, the 
plaintiffs claimed they faced an increased risk of identity theft necessitating 
measures to guard against that risk, including monitoring financial accounts to 
look for possible identity theft.13 The district court, in that case, dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims finding no injury to support standing.14 
 
1.  Elizabeth A. Harris, Nicole Perlroth & Nathaniel Popper, Neiman Marcus Data Breach Worse Than 
First Said, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/business/neiman-marcus-breach-
affected-1-1-million-cards.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2.  Id.        
3.  Id.        
4.  Suevon Lee, Neiman Marcus to Pay $1.6M in Shopper Data Breach Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/903573/neiman-marcus-to-pay-1-6m-in-shopper-data-breach-suit (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5.  Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2015). 
6.  Id. at 692. 
7.  Id. at 691. 
8.  Id. at 697. 
9.  Id. at 693, 696. 
10.  Lee, supra note 4.           
11.  In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017). 
12.  Id. at 767. 
13.  Id. at 769, 771. 
14.  Id. at 767. 
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found the plaintiffs’ risk of future harm 
insufficient to confer standing.15 The court looked to a government report on 
identity theft, which found the vast majority of data breaches do not lead to 
identity theft or fraud.16 Based on the report, the court found it unlikely plaintiffs 
would suffer payment card fraud and therefore the risk of future harm was 
inadequate for standing.17 The court also held the costs expended guarding 
against fraud insufficient because safeguarding against a speculative threat does 
not confer standing.18 
The Neiman Marcus and SuperValu data breaches are examples of data 
breaches over the past decade that have affected millions of Americans.19 With 
data breaches on the rise, the number of consumers affected will likely increase.20 
The type of information stolen varies; some data breaches affect credit card and 
debit card information,21 others involve more sensitive information, such as 
Social Security numbers or medical histories.22 Additionally, while some of these 
breaches affect national retailers,23 hackers also target small businesses,24 which 
may present an easier target because of lesser data protection safeguards.25 The 
consequences of any breach vary, but can include fraudulent payment card usage 
 
15.  Id. at 771. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  See Jia Lynn Yang & Amrita Jayakumar, Target Says Up to 70 Million More Customers Were Hit by 
December Data Breach, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/targ 
et-says-70-million-customers-were-hit-by-dec-data-breach-more-than-first-reported/2014/01/10/0ada1026-79fe-
11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the 
data breach affecting Target in which hackers stole the credit card and debit card information of up to 40 
million customers); Tara Siegal Bernard et al., Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the Equifax cyberattack in which hackers 
accessed “data that potentially compromised sensitive information for 143 million American consumers”). 
20.  See Data Breaches in U.S. Allegedly Increasing at Record Pace, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/data-breaches-us-b73014462190/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(noting 29 percent in data breaches in the first half of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016). 
21.  Yang & Jayakumar, supra note 19.                   
22.  Siegal Bernard et al., supra note 19.    
23.  Nandita Bose, Home Depot Confirms Security Breach Following Target Data Theft, REUTERS (Sept. 
8, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-home-depot-databreach/home-depot-confirms-security-breach-
following-target-data-theft-idUSKBN0H327E20140909 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
24.  E. Scott Reckard & Tiffany Hsu, Small Businesses at High Risk for Data Breach, L.A. TIMES (July 4, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-small-data-breaches-20140705-story.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
25.  Steve Strauss, Cyber Threat Is Huge for Small Businesses, USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/strauss/2017/10/20/cyber-threat-huge-small-
businesses/782716001/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“90% of small businesses [do 
not] use data protection”). 
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and identity theft.26 
These data breaches frequently lead to lawsuits.27 While Remijas and the 
affected Neiman Marcus customers successfully brought their claims in federal 
court and ultimately reached a settlement, had the case been filed in another 
circuit, the result could be different.28 Circuits are split with one side adopting the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach in Remijas and the other adhering to the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning in SuperValu.29 
Although the Supreme Court issued a 2016 decision discussing the injury 
requirement of standing, the ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins failed to resolve the 
circuit split.30 In 2017 alone, the D.C. Circuit found the increased risk of identity 
theft due to data breaches constituted a sufficient injury for standing, but the 
Fourth and Eighth Circuits held that risk insufficient.31 
This Comment argues the Supreme Court should adopt the approach used by 
the Courts of Appeals finding standing.32 Alternatively, Congress could resolve 
the data breach standing issue by narrowly crafting a statute recognizing a 
person’s interest in their personally identifiable information and the harm a data 
breach poses to that interest.33 Part II discusses the Article III standing 
requirements in the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court and how federal courts applied these rules to data breach cases before 
 
26.  Adam Shell, Equifax Data Breach Could Create Lifelong Identity Theft Threat, USA TODAY (Sept. 
9, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/09/equifax-data-breach-could-create-life-long-identit 
y-theft-threat/646765001/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
27.  See Lawsuits Against Equifax Pile Up After Massive Data Breach, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-cyber-lawsuits/lawsuits-against-equifax-pile-up-after-massive-data-
breach-idUSKCN1BM2E3 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the filing of more 
than 30 lawsuits against Equifax in the wake of the Equifax data breach). 
28.  See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding a breach of personally 
identifiable information stemming from theft of a medical center’s laptop did not give rise to standing); Whalen 
v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding a breach of credit card and debit card 
information leading to alleged fraudulent usage did not give rise to standing). 
29.  Edward R. McNicholas & Grady Nye, D.C. Circuit Widens the Split on Standing in Data Breach 
Cases After Spokeo, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7335a949-
2364-4f44-9c2a-74939d5ea1da (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The Sixth, Seventh, 
Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have found standing in these cases, but the Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Eighth have not. Dominic Spinelli, Data Breach Standing: Recent Decisions Show Growing Circuit Court Split, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_serie 
s/data_breach_standing_recent_decisions_show_gowing_circuit_court_split.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); infra Part II; infra Part IV.  
30.  McNicholas & Nye, supra note 29.    
31.  Andrew C. Glass, David D. Christensen & Matthew N. Love, Data Breach Doubleheader: The 
Eighth Circuit Issues Two Decisions Addressing Boundaries of Standing in Data Breach Class Actions, K&L 
GATES (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/data-breach-doubleheader-the-eighth-circuit-issues-two-decision 
s-addressing-boundaries-of-standing-in-data-breach-class-actions-10-09-2017/ (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
32.  Infra Part IV. 
33.  Infra Part V. 
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Clapper v. Amnesty International.34 Part III discusses two recent Supreme Court 
decisions regarding standing, Clapper and Spokeo.35 Part IV discusses the 
growing circuit split concerning data breach standing and contends finding the 
future risk of harm sufficient is the better approach that the Supreme Court 
should adopt.36 In the alternative, Part V proposes a law to resolve the circuit 
split and discusses the advantages of a statutory solution.37 Either a Supreme 
Court ruling or a statutory solution can resolve this circuit split and bring 
certainty to the standing determination in data breach cases.38 
II. ARTICLE III STANDING AND PRE-CLAPPER STANDING IN DATA BREACH 
CASES 
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts federal courts to 
deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.”39 This restriction ensures the judicial 
branch of the federal government does not overstep its constitutional bounds by 
taking  over powers of the legislative and executive branches.40 To fall within the 
jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by the Constitution, a plaintiff must have 
standing.41 Standing shows the plaintiff has a stake in the matter warranting the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction.42 
To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) an 
injury showing an “invasion of a legally protected interest”; (2) a causal link 
between the injury and the alleged conduct of the defendant; and (3) the injury is 
“redressab[able] by a favorable decision.”43 Additionally, the injury cannot be 
indefinite.44 It must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not 
 
34.  Infra Part II. Clapper v. Amnesty International was a Supreme Court decision regarding injury-in-fact 
and the case had a significant effect on data breach litigation. 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Rebecca J. Schwartz, New 
U.S. Supreme Court Decision Will Likely Impact Data Breach Litigation, DATA SEC. L. J. (Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://www.datasecuritylawjournal.com/2013/03/07/new-u-s-supreme-court-decision-will-likely-impact-data-
breach-litigation/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting Clapper confirmed the high 
bar for finding standing on the basis of increased risk of harm in data breach cases). 
35.  Infra Part III. 
36.  Infra Part IV. 
37.  Infra Part V. While previous scholarship has discussed statutory solutions to the data breach circuit 
split, it has not given the language of a proposed statute. E.g. Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data 
Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, and a Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 
117 (2017) (discussing a statutory solution to the data breach circuit split, but not proposing specific statutory 
language). 
38.  Infra Parts IV, V. 
39.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
40.  DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 
(1997)) (“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than 
the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”). 
41.  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). 
42.  Id. 
43.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
44.  Id. at 574 (citing Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488–89 (1923)). 
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conjectural or hypothetical.”45 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
standing.46 Lack of standing means federal courts do not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case.47 
Data breach cases present a unique problem for plaintiffs attempting to 
establish standing.48 While affected companies or organizations often come 
forward and reveal data breaches before a plaintiff files a lawsuit,49 stolen 
information is not always used maliciously.50 Because of this uncertainty, people 
affected by a data breach may have difficulty demonstrating their injury is 
“concrete” and “actual or imminent.”51 
Even before the Clapper decision, in which the Supreme Court narrowed its 
standard for future injuries and standing,52 federal courts diverged in finding 
standing for data breaches.53 Section A discusses pre-Clapper data breach cases 
and the courts’ reasoning to find standing.54 Section B discusses pre-Clapper data 
breach cases that did not find standing and explains why the courts reached those 
decisions.55 
A. Pre-Clapper Data Breach Cases Finding Standing 
In Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, the Seventh Circuit held the threat of 
future harm relating to a data breach was a sufficient injury to establish 
standing.56 Old National Bancorp ran a website where customers could submit 
 
45.  Id. at 560. 
46.  DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006). 
47.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 
(1973)) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered 
‘some threatened or actual injury.’”). 
48.  See Robert D. Fram, Simon J. Frankel & Amanda C. Lynch, Standing in Data Breach Cases: A 
Review of Recent Trends, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bna.com/standing-data-breach-
n57982063308/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting defense attorneys have had 
success dismissing data breach cases because of plaintiffs’ lack of actual harm to grant standing).  
49.  See Staples Says Security Breach May Have Affected 1.16 Million Cards, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-staples-cybersecurity/staples-says-security-breach-may-have-affected-1-16-
million-cards-idUSKBN0JX2CY20141219 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining 
Staples’ admission it was subject to a data breach in which credit card and debit card information may have 
been accessed). 
50.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT SERVICES: SERVICES OFFER SOME 
BENEFITS BUT ARE LIMITED IN PREVENTING FRAUD 3 (Mar. 2017), available at 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683842.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting 
“data breaches do not necessarily result in identity theft”). 
51.  See id.  
52.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 
53.  Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court 
Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1336–43 (2017). 
54.  Infra Part II.A. 
55.  Infra Part II.B. 
56.  Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50 
433 
applications for banking services, an action requiring entering personal 
information.57 A hacker breached the website and accessed sensitive customer 
information.58 Affected individuals brought a class action suit against Old 
National Bancorp and the servicer of the website, NCR Corporation, for 
negligence and breach of contract claims.59 The plaintiffs alleged emotional 
distress and potential economic damages.60 NCR successfully moved to dismiss 
the claims against it and Old National Bancorp moved for judgment on the 
pleadings.61 
The district court granted the motion finding a lack of “cognizable injury.”62 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit turned to other circuit court decisions.63 For 
example, the court pointed to Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S. C., Inc. where the 
Sixth Circuit held the increased risk of future health complications stemming 
from a defective medical device created standing.64 Finding these toxic exposure 
and defective medical device cases sufficiently analogous, the Pisciotta court 
held the threat of future harm was enough of an injury to confer standing.65 
Similar to Pisciotta, in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit held 
the higher risk of identity theft stemming from a data breach was a sufficient 
injury to confer standing.66 In Krottner, an unknown thief stole a Starbucks 
laptop containing personally identifiable information from nearly one hundred 
thousand Starbucks employees.67 Affected Starbucks employees filed class action 
lawsuits against Starbucks, claiming negligence and breach of implied contract.68 
These plaintiffs alleged harm in the form of increased risk of identity theft and 
one class representative alleged an injury of anxiety and stress due to the laptop 
theft.69 
The district court in Krottner found the plaintiffs established Article III 
standing.70 The Ninth Circuit affirmed and found the anxiety and stress injury 
was sufficient to confer standing before turning to the other alleged harm.71 The 
court stated increased risk of identity theft was a “credible threat of real and 
 
57.  Id. at 631. 
58.  Id. at 632. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 634. 
64.  Id. at 634 n.3; Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005). 
65.  Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634. 
66.  Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). 
67.  Id. at 1140. 
68.  Id. at 1141. 
69.  Id. at 1142. 
70.  Id. at 1141. 
71.  Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142. 
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immediate harm” that was not “conjectural or hypothetical.”72 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit examined its prior decisions allowing future harm 
to confer standing in environmental claims.73 
Then the court looked at other Courts of Appeals, specifically the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits.74 Viewing favorably the Seventh Circuit’s holding that future 
harm can confer standing in Pisciotta,75 the Ninth Circuit held the affected 
Starbucks employees had standing due to the risk of future identity theft.76 
Despite multiple circuit courts finding standing in data breach litigation, other 
courts reached the opposite conclusion.77 
B. Pre-Clapper Data Breach Cases Not Finding Standing 
In Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri found the increased possibility of identity theft 
insufficient for standing purposes despite a data breach.78 There, a hacker 
infiltrated Express Scripts’ database and accessed personal information before 
threatening to make the information public.79 John Amburgy, an affected 
individual, brought a class action lawsuit against Express Scripts alleging 
negligence, contract violations, and other state law violations.80 Like the Pisciotta 
and Krottner plaintiffs, Amburgy alleged an increased risk of fraud and crime 
after the breach, as well as damages for the time and money spent protecting 
against potential crimes.81 Express Scripts then moved to dismiss the case, 
claiming the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Amburgy did 
not have standing.82 
After reviewing the requirements for standing, the court noted the federal 
courts were split in finding the future risk of identity theft sufficient for 
standing.83 The court addressed Pisciotta’s holding that found standing, but it 
expressed reluctance to follow a “recent trend” given standing’s constitutional 
basis.84 Turning to the plaintiff’s allegations, the court determined Amburgy’s 
alleged injury was not imminent because he failed to show if and/or when a 
 
72.  Id. at 1143. 
73.  Id. at 1142 (“[I]n the context of environmental claims, a plaintiff may challenge governmental action 
that creates ‘a credible threat of harm’ before the potential harm . . . has occurred.”). 
74.  Id. at 1142–43. 
75.  Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007). 
76.  Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143. 
77.  Infra Part II.B. 
78.  Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
79.  Id. at 1049. 
80.  Id. at 1048–49. 
81.  Id. at 1049. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Amburgy, 671 F. Supp. at 1050. 
84.  Id. at 1051. 
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criminal would maliciously use his personal information.85 Thus, the court 
labeled Amburgy’s alleged injury speculative and uncertain, lacking the concrete 
nature required for standing.86 Therefore, the court dismissed the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.87 
A similar breach of personal and financial information occurred in Reilly v. 
Ceridian Corp., where the Third Circuit held that an increased risk of identity 
theft was a hypothetical injury and therefore insufficient to confer standing.88 
There, Ceridian, a payroll company, stored social security numbers, birthdates, 
and other sensitive information for its customers’ employees.89 In December 
2009, a hacker accessed the information of 27,000 employees.90 Later in October 
2010, affected employees filed a class action suit against Ceridian for negligence, 
contract, and breach of statutory violations.91 Similar to Krottner, the plaintiffs 
alleged an increased risk of identity theft, along with costs for monitoring their 
credit.92 The district judge granted Ceridian’s motion to dismiss on the ground 
the plaintiffs lacked standing.93 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling.94 The court 
held that until the hacker used the personal information maliciously,  “no misuse 
of the information, and thus, no harm” occurred.95 Although the court recognized 
future injuries can confer standing if they are imminent, it found the plaintiffs’ 
injuries were too conjectural to be imminent.96 In particular, the court noted 
future identity theft would depend on circumstances such as “if the hacker 
attempt[ed] to use the information, and if he d[id] so successfully.”97 
The Third Circuit then criticized the “skimpy rationale” of the Pisciotta and 
Krottner decisions.98 The Reilly court stated comparisons to environmental cases, 
as done in Krottner,99 were inappropriate.100 The court criticized these 
comparisons because in environmental suits monetary compensation “may not 
adequately return plaintiffs to their original position,” but data breach defendants 
 
85.  Id. at 1052. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. at 1058. 
88.  Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
89.  Id. at 40. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., No. 10–5142, 2011 WL 735512, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011), aff’d, 664 
F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
92.  Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40. 
93.  Id. at 41. 
94.  Id. at 46. 
95.  Id. at 42. 
96.  Id. at 43. 
97.  Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43. 
98.  Id. at 44. 
99.  Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010). 
100.  Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45. 
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can easily recompense for identity fraud with monetary compensation.101 With a 
growing circuit split, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to lay down 
guidance on the issue.102 
III. THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN: CLAPPER AND SPOKEO 
In 2013, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA.103 Although Clapper concerned constitutional 
privacy, its effect on the standing doctrine had a large impact on data breach 
cases.104 Section A discusses the Clapper opinion and its effect on standing 
requirements.105 Section B discusses the Spokeo ruling and how it affected 
standing rules.106 
A. Clapper and the Strict Requirements for Standing 
In 2008, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 changing how 
the government could surveil foreign individuals.107 Various individuals and 
organizations, such as attorneys and human rights groups, challenged the law and 
claimed it would subject their communications with foreign individuals to United 
States government surveillance.108 Those challenging the law made two 
arguments regarding the injury required for standing: (1) the likelihood the 
government would surveil their communications under the law, and (2) costs 
spent to protect against government interception of communications.109 
At the district court level, the judge granted the government’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding those challenging the law lacked standing.110 The 
Second Circuit reversed the district court, finding alleged future injuries 
“sufficiently likely” to create standing.111 
After examining the prior decisions on the case, the Supreme Court turned to 
the legal requirements for standing.112 The Court reiterated its rule that “an injury 
 
101.  Id. at 45–46. 
102.  Infra Part III. 
103.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
104.  See Douglas Meal & David Cohen, How High Court’s Clapper Ruling Will Impact Breach Cases, 
LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/420896/how-high-court-s-clapper-ruling-will-
impact-breach-cases (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the Clapper opinion will 
likely help data breach defendants dismiss cases against them). 
105.  Infra Part III.A. 
106.  Infra Part III.B. 
107.  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 404. 
108.  Id. at 406. 
109.  Id. at 407. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
112.  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 
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must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the 
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”113 Further, the Court 
added that standing inquiries are “especially rigorous” when they involve 
separation of powers or national security issues.114 It then stated the injury must 
be “certainly impending” to confer standing and that allegations of possible 
future injury were insufficient.115 
Applying these requirements, the Court held the respondents’ first 
argument—that the government was likely to surveil their communications—
relied on conjecture and possibilities, not enough to be certainly impending.116 
The opinion noted surveillance of respondents’ communications would require 
the government to target respondents’ foreign contacts using the challenged 
law.117 Thus, this potential series of events—labeled the “chain of 
possibilities”—was too speculative.118 The second theory—concerning the costs 
spent protecting against government surveillance—was similarly insufficient 
because respondents took measures to avoid a harm that was not certainly 
impending.119 For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the Second 
Circuit’s ruling.120 
In the opinion, the majority referenced another test for whether future harm 
confers standing.121 In certain cases, the Court has held the “substantial risk” that 
harm will occur constitutes a sufficient injury.122 However, the majority did not 
fully explore the boundaries of this other standard, except to note respondents 
would also fail under this standard because of the speculative nature of the 
harm.123 
The majority’s thorough discussion of how injuries must be “certainly 
impending” for standing and the placement of the “substantial risk” standard in a 
footnote identified “certainly impending” as the dominant rule.124 Thus, the 
Supreme Court highlighted a test with a “very strict” standard.125 This high 
 
113.  Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
114.  Id. at 408–09. 
115.  Id. at 409. 
116.  Id. at 410. 
117.  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411. 
118.  Id. at 414. 
119.  Id. at 416. 
120.  Id. at 422. 
121.  Id. at 414 n.5. 
122.  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5. 
123.  See id. (“But to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from the 
‘clearly impending’ requirement, respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of 
inferences necessary to find harm here.”). 
124.  See id. at 409, 414 n.5 (noting the discussion of certainly impending in the body of the opinion but 
pointing to how substantial risk appears in a footnote). 
125.  Patrick Gallagher, Environmental Law, Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA and the Vagaries of 
Injury-in-Fact: “Certainly Impending” Harm, “Reasonable Concern,” and “Geographic Nexus”, 32 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L & POL’Y 1, 1 (2014). 
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standard poses a challenge for data breach plaintiffs potentially unaware of the 
specifics of the breach, such as when the defendant worked to cover up the 
breach.126 Additionally, under the Clapper standard, “certainly impending” harm 
may require certain events, like the hacker making an unauthorized purchase with 
the stolen information.127 Because Clapper deemed “speculative chain[s] of 
possibilities” insufficient for an injury,128 the case was problematic for data 
breach plaintiffs.129 
Now armed with this powerful tool,130 data breach defendants effectively 
used it to dismiss cases against them.131 Although Clapper may have shifted the 
scales toward data breach defendants, federal courts post-Clapper continued to 
reach opposite conclusions on standing.132 Thus, the stage was set for another 
Supreme Court opinion.133 
B. Spokeo and the Failure to Resolve the Standing Issue 
Amidst the ongoing standing question, in 2015 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari for Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.134 Although it did not involve a data breach, 
Spokeo concerned how statutory violations relate to standing and the type of 
injury sufficient to confer standing.135 Thus, the grant of certiorari led some to 
believe the Supreme Court would put the data breach standing issue to rest.136 
 
126.  See Gabrielle Orum Hernández, Uber’s Data Breach Cover-Up Strategy May Be More Common 
Than You’d Think, CONN. L. TRIB. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/sites/ctlawtribune/2017/ 
11/30/ubers-data-breach-cover-up-strategy-may-be-more-common-than-youd-think/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting data breaches often go unreported or are often covered up). 
127.  Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
128.  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. 
129.  See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (stating unless and until certain events occurred, the data breach plaintiff 
had not suffered a harm). 
130.  Meal & Cohen, supra note 104.            
131.  Heidi J. Milicic, Standing to Bring Data Breach Class Actions Post-Clapper, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 
7, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer2014-0814-data-breach-
class-actions-post-clapper.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting at the time of 
the article’s publication virtually all data breach “defendant[s] asserting a Clapper-based challenge ha[ve] been 
successful” in contesting standing). 
132.  See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding the increased 
risk of harm from a data breach sufficient for standing); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape 
Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding identity theft risk alone insufficient to confer 
standing). 
133.  Infra Part III.B. 
134.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/spokeo-inc-v-
robins/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the Supreme 
Court granted the petition for certiorari on April 27, 2015). 
135.  Marcus A. Asner et al., Supreme Court Expected to Decide Soon Whether to Grant Certiorari in 
Spokeo, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9fd4a392-e4e2-4713-
88c7-6d911829a69b (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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Spokeo, a consumer reporting agency, ran a “people search engine” which 
generated profiles containing personal information about individuals.137 Thomas 
Robins accessed his own profile on Spokeo’s service and found inaccuracies.138 
He brought a class action suit against Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA) based on the incorrect information.139 The district court dismissed the 
case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the alleged 
statutory violation sufficient to confer standing.140 
The Supreme Court addressed how statutes affect standing, noting Congress’ 
ability to make previously inadequate injuries adequate for standing purposes.141 
However, not all statutory violations give rise to standing because the injury 
needs to be particularized—that is, both individualized and concrete.142 An injury 
is concrete if it actually exists.143 The majority rejected the need for additional 
harm beyond the harm Congress specified, but maintained a mere procedural 
violation of a law is not enough.144 The Court then remanded to the Ninth Circuit, 
directing the Ninth Circuit to discuss the concreteness requirement.145 
Spokeo is relevant to data breach litigation because the case concerned the 
type of injury necessary for standing.146 Additionally, there is greater relevance 
because data breach plaintiffs, similar to the Spokeo class, often claim statutory 
violations.147 Like the plaintiffs in the Spokeo case, data breach plaintiffs may 
allege standing under violations of the FCRA.148 Therefore, the inability of a 
procedural FCRA violation to confer standing may impact data breach cases 
implicating the statute.149 
Despite Spokeo’s relevance to data breach lawsuits, the opinion did not 
address the “certainly impending” test and contained minimal discussion of the 
imminence requirement, limiting the opinion’s ability to put the standing 
question to rest.150 Therefore, although the Supreme Court issued an opinion on 
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(“All four of the named Plaintiffs argue that the violation of their statutory rights under FCRA gave rise to a 
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standing, the data breach standing circuit split continues.151 
 IV. THE CONTINUING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER DATA BREACH STANDING AND A 
SUPREME COURT SOLUTION 
Though the Supreme Court handed down the Spokeo opinion in 2016, the 
growing incidence of data breach litigation has since led to a sizeable circuit 
split.152 Just as before Spokeo, the divide centers around whether the increased 
risk of identity theft sufficiently confers standing.153 Section A discusses circuit 
courts finding standing in data breach suits post-Spokeo and their reasoning.154 
Section B addresses a circuit court decision rejecting standing in a data breach 
case post-Spokeo and its rationale.155 Section C argues finding standing in data 
breach suits is the better approach and why the Supreme Court should so hold.156 
A. Recent Data Breach Cases Finding Standing 
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit held the increased risk of identity theft, along with 
costs expended to address the risk, a sufficient injury to confer standing.157 In 
Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., hackers breached Nationwide’s 
databases and stole over a million customers’ personal information.158 In 
response, affected customers spent time and money watching for identity theft.159 
Two of these customers brought separate class action lawsuits against 
Nationwide for FCRA violations and alleged tort causes of action.160 The cases 
were later consolidated, but the district court dismissed them holding the 
plaintiffs lacked standing by failing to allege a cognizable injury or state a claim 
for relief.161 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal.162 Rather than focus on 
Clapper’s “certainly impending” test,163 the court used the “substantial risk” 
standard.164 The court held the substantial risk of identity theft and fraud, along 
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151.  Infra Part IV. 
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with mitigation costs, was a cognizable injury.165 Addressing Clapper, the court 
found no need to speculate about future injuries because hackers already had the 
plaintiffs’ personal information.166 Unlike Clapper, where the Supreme Court 
found the government’s potential interception of plaintiffs’ communications too 
uncertain,167 the Galaria court found the targeting of personal information 
allowed for the reasonable inference the hackers would take malicious action.168 
Furthermore, the court distinguished Clapper by noting the imminence of the 
identity theft.169 
A similar data breach affected the health insurer CareFirst and in the 
resulting case the D.C. Circuit found the substantial risk of future harm sufficient 
for standing.170 Hackers accessed CareFirst’s database containing customer 
information, such as names and social security numbers.171 In the resulting class 
action, plaintiffs made several claims including, negligence and breach of 
contract.172 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case because neither a 
present injury nor a likely future injury existed.173 
The circuit court affirmed the validity of both the “certainly impending” and 
“substantial risk” tests.174 Using the latter test, the court found a substantial risk 
of future harm arose when the hacker stole the sensitive information.175 Similar to 
the Galaria court, the Attias court noted how the plaintiffs presented a greater 
risk of harm than in Clapper.176 Unlike the Clapper scenario, a hacker already 
breached CareFirst’s database making the risk of future harm more substantial 
and less speculative.177 Finding a sufficient injury for standing, the court reversed 
the dismissal.178 
Another data breach lawsuit forced the Ninth Circuit to determine if its 
holding in Krottner remained valid after Clapper.179 In In re Zappos.com, Inc., 
the court held Krottner to be reconcilable with Clapper.180 In Zappos, hackers 
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breached the defendant’s servers and allegedly obtained customers’ payment card 
information and other personal information.181 Several affected customers filed 
class action lawsuits claiming inadequate protection of their personal 
information.182 After consolidating the suits, the district court held the plaintiffs 
lacked allegations of actual identity theft.183 Thus, the plaintiffs did not have 
standing and the district court dismissed their suits.184 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal on appeal.185 Similar to the courts in 
Galaria and Attias, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the “certainly impending” 
standard in Clapper but used the “substantial risk” standard instead.186 In holding 
Krottner valid, the court noted Krottner did not involve “national security or 
separation of powers concerns” and therefore the standing analysis was less 
rigorous than in Clapper.187 With Krottner as precedent, the court held the 
plaintiffs’ substantial risk of identity theft or fraud was a sufficient injury to 
confer standing.188 While the Sixth, D.C., and Ninth Circuits found standing from 
the risk of identity theft post-Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ 
standing based on the same risk.189 
B. A Recent Data Breach Case Not Finding Standing 
The Fourth Circuit held the increased risk of identity theft stemming from a 
data breach too speculative to confer standing in Beck v. McDonald.190 A laptop 
containing personal information for thousands of patients went missing from a 
Veterans Affairs hospital.191 An investigation deemed it likely stolen.192 Two 
patients brought a class action lawsuit alleging negligence and statutory 
violations.193 At the district court level, the judge held the risk of future identity 
theft and measures protecting against that risk inadequate for standing.194 
On appeal, the circuit court considered the uncertainty of whether a thief took 
the laptop to commit identity theft and the lack of actual identity theft 
allegations.195 Therefore, the court held a risk of future harm insufficient for 
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standing because that harm was speculative.196 
Unlike some other circuit courts,197 the Beck court used statistics in its 
holding.198 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that 33% of affected patients 
would fall victim to identity theft, a percentage the court determined too small a 
figure to meet the “substantial risk” test.199 Time and money spent on protective 
measures, such as credit monitoring services, failed to confer standing because 
the patients took these steps in response to a speculative threat.200 
This growing circuit split identified by Beck201can lead to negative 
consequences, such as forum shopping; therefore, federal courts should use a 
singular approach to data breach standing.202 
C. The Better Approach to Standing 
The circumstances in data breach cases differ, including whether a thief stole 
payment card information or more sensitive data, such as social security 
numbers.203 However, in all of these cases the end result is often the same—
confidential information is now vulnerable and likely in the hands of criminals.204 
These data breaches can lead to severe penalties and prison time for hackers.205 
Because of the serious consequences, criminals likely do not break into databases 
without reason.206 These hackers commonly sell the stolen information on the 
internet where the information may be bought to commit identity theft or 
fraud.207 Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule 
establishing increased risk of identity theft and fraud as a sufficient injury for 
standing under the “substantial risk” standard.208 
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In formulating this rule, the Supreme Court should take a similar stance as 
the Seventh Circuit in Remijas and consider why hackers targeted the database.209 
“Why . . . would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ 
private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to 
make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”210 
Courts often reference the “speculative chain of possibilities” in Clapper211 
when denying standing on the basis of future harm in data breach cases.212 The 
Clapper respondents alleged an injury requiring five contingent events before the 
harm occurred.213 Unlike Clapper, hackers have often already accessed a 
database with personal information in data breach cases and now possess the 
sensitive data.214 The hacker, or another criminal, need only maliciously use that 
stolen information for the identity theft or fraud to occur.215 Thus, only one event 
needs to happen for the harm to arise.216 This, along with the likely reason 
criminals hack databases,217 presents not a “speculative chain of possibilities,” 
but a plausible result that substantially increases the risk of identity theft or 
fraud.218 
Despite Clapper’s focus on the “certainly impending” test,219 federal courts 
have discretion in analyzing future injuries under either the “certainly 
impending” test or the “substantial risk” test.220 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should clarify that the “substantial risk” test applies to data breach cases.221 
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Unlike Clapper, data breach cases do not involve national security or separation 
of powers issues, making the standing inquiry less rigorous.222 This less rigorous 
inquiry means the “substantial risk” test is appropriate for data breach cases.223 
Because a breach of private information creates a substantial risk of identity 
theft, the Supreme Court should hold data breaches of personal information 
constitute a sufficient future injury for standing.224 
 Application of the “certainly impending” test could still allow for standing as 
seen in In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation.225 In data breaches, hackers 
steal personal information to use it for criminal purposes; therefore, the 
likelihood of identity theft or fraud is much greater than the harm in Clapper.226 
Unlike Clapper, no speculation is needed to find hackers have already taken the 
plaintiff’s personal information.227 
 Steps taken to protect against a hypothetical or speculative future harm are not 
considered an adequate injury.228 However, the Supreme Court should consider 
holding the costs expended to safeguard against identity theft resulting from data 
breaches as a sufficient injury because data breaches of private information 
create more concrete risks of harm229 In lieu of a Supreme Court ruling, a statute 
could also resolve the data breach standing issue.230 
 V. A STATUTORY SOLUTION 
A statutory solution may cure the data breach standing issue by specifying an 
individual’s interest in the confidentiality of his or her personal information and 
exposure of the information in a data breach harms this interest.231 Section A 
discusses how statutes can establish standing.232 Section B provides the language 
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of a proposed statute.233 Section C addresses the advantages of a statutory 
solution.234 
A. Statutes and Standing 
While the standing doctrine is constitutionally rooted,235 statutes can be 
relevant to determine whether standing exists in a case.236 “The actual or 
threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes 
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”237 Additionally, 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that 
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”238 Thus, 
Congress can make previously inadequate injuries sufficient for standing.239 
In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc., the Third Circuit held alleged 
violations of statutory rights under the FCRA were sufficient injuries for 
standing.240 There, a thief stole two laptops containing the personal information, 
including Social Security numbers, of a health insurer’s customers.241 
The Third Circuit found “Congress established that the unauthorized 
dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an 
injury in and of itself.”242 The court’s determination rested on how Congress 
established a private right of action in the FCRA and the harm to be prevented by 
the law closely related to invasion of privacy, a traditional basis for lawsuits.243 
Thus, the Third Circuit held the alleged FCRA violations sufficient for standing 
purposes.244 
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court indicated Congress could elevate concrete 
injuries into an injury-in-fact for standing.245 Furthermore, the Court stated 
intangible injuries or the risk of real harm could meet the concreteness 
 
233.  Infra Part V.B. 
234.  Infra Part V.C. 
235.  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009). 
236.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
237.  Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D, 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)). 
238.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
239.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578). An example 
includes the Clean Air Act’s granting of a procedural right to protect a person’s concrete interests. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7607(b)(1) (West 2018); Mass. v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007). 
240.  In re Horizon Healthcare Litigation Services Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 635 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
241.  Id. at 630. 
242.  Id. at 639. 
243.  Id. at 639–40. 
244.  Id. at 640. 
245.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
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requirement.246 Data breaches bring the risk of real harm by identity theft or fraud 
to those affected.247 Even though there is only a risk of harm and the exposure of 
personal information is intangible, data breaches can create concrete injuries that 
satisfy the concreteness requirement.248 Thus, Congress could enact a statute to 
elevate the concrete injury, exposure of personal information in data breaches, to 
an injury-in-fact.249 With guidance from cases like Spokeo and In re Horizon 
Healthcare Services Inc., a statute could confer standing in data breach cases.250 
B. Proposed Statutory Language 
The following is the text of a proposed statute to end the data breach standing 
circuit split, taking language and influence from California’s data breach 
notification law.251 California’s law serves as a strong starting point because it 
was the first data breach notification law in the United States and has served as a 
model followed by other states.252 Additionally, multiple amendments over the 
years to California’s data breach notification law means the law is still up-to-date 
and can act as a model for the proposed statute.253 
 
(a)  A person has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of his 
or her personal information.254 
(b)  The interest in the confidentiality of personal information is 
harmed when the personal information is exposed in a data 
breach in accordance with subdivision (c).255 
 
246.  Id. 
247.  See In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“[T]he information taken in the data breach . . . gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft.”). 
248.  See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (noting intangible injuries can be concrete and the risk of real harm 
can satisfy the concreteness requirement). 
249.  See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)) (“Congress may ‘elevat[e] 
to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’”). 
250.  Infra Part V.B. 
251.  See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2018) (noting the law’s provisions to serve as a 
model for the proposed statute). 
252.  See Brandy L. Worden, Understanding California’s Data Breach Notification Law: Protecting Your 
Company & Customers, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a18fee34 
-e1cb-4993-9e6c-d98fcd86f6e9 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“California became the 
first state to enact its Data Breach Notification Law. This law has become a model that has been followed by 
many states across the United States.”). 
253.  See id. (indicating the California Legislature has amended the California data breach notification 
law over the years, with the most recent changes taking effect in January 2017). 
254.  See generally In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (noting the sensitivity of the information stolen in a data breach and how the exposed information 
“gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft”). 
255.  See generally id. (discussing the sensitivity of the information stolen in a data breach and how the 
exposed information “gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft”). 
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(c)  The harm in subdivision (b) arises if:256 
(1) the personal information was stored unencrypted, or257 
(2) the personal information was stored encrypted, but the 
encryption key or security credential was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an 
unauthorized person.258 
(d)  A person experiencing the harm in subdivision (b) may, either at 
law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue the 
individual or business maintaining the database that experienced 
the data breach.259 
(e)  A person bringing an action under this section against an 
individual may recover only the actual expenses, if reasonable 
under the circumstances, incurred as a result of the data 
breach.260 
(f)  A person bringing an action under this section against a business 
employing less than 100 employees may recover only the actual 
expenses, if reasonable under the circumstances, incurred as a 
result of the data breach.261 
(g)  A person harmed under this section shall be entitled to freeze 
their credit with credit reporting agencies at no cost within one 
year of the disclosure of the data breach.262 
(1) The costs to freeze credit under subdivision (g) shall be 
paid for by the individual or business maintaining the 
database that experienced the data breach.263 
(2) For purposes of subdivision (g), “credit reporting 
agencies” means the following credit reporting agencies: 
 
256.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018). 
257.  Id.    
258.  Id.    
259.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a) (West 2018). 
260.  See generally A.J. Dellinger, Americans Spent $1.4 Billion on Credit Freezes After Equifax Breach, 
MSN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/americans-spent-dollar14-billion-on-credit-
freezes-after-equifax-breach/ar-BBKzDIZ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Americans 
spent an estimated $1.4 billion on credit freezes in the wake of the massive data breach at credit reporting 
company Equifax.”); Jessica Vomiero, Small Businesses Often More Vulnerable to Cyberattacks, Experts Say, 
GLOBAL NEWS (June 30, 2017), https://globalnews.ca/news/3567122/petya-ransomware-cybersecurity-
businesses/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the limited financial resources of 
small businesses to defend against cyberattacks and deal with the consequences of one). 
261.  See generally Dellinger, supra note 260 (“Americans spent an estimated $1.4 billion on credit 
freezes in the wake of the massive data breach at credit reporting company Equifax . . . .”); Vomiero, supra note 
260 (noting the limited financial resources of small businesses to defend against cyberattacks and deal with the 
consequences of one). 
262.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d)(2)(G) (West 2018). 
263.  Id.    
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Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion.264 
(h)  For purposes of this section, “data breach” means the 
unauthorized access and acquisition of computerized data 
containing personal information.265 
(i)  For purposes of this section, “personal information” means:266 
(1) A person’s first name or first initial and last name in 
combination with one or more of the following:267 
(A) Social security number.268 
(B) Driver’s license number.269 
(C) Account number or credit card or debit card 
number.270 
(D) Medical information.271 
(E) Health insurance information.272 
(2) A user name or email address, in combination with a 
password, or security question and answer, that would 
permit access to an online account.273 
 
Through the adoption of a statute like the proposed solution, Congress could 
end the data breach standing circuit split.274 
C. Advantages of a Statutory Solution 
While a Supreme Court ruling could put the standing issue to rest, a federal 
statute would offer some benefits.275 The statute would have to advance through 
the deliberative legislative process.276 This legislative process lets stakeholders 
 
264.  See LaToya Irby, Who Are the Three Major Credit Bureaus?, THE BALANCE (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/who-are-the-three-major-credit-bureaus-960416 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (noting Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion are the three major credit reporting agencies in 
the United States). 
265.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(g) (West 2018). 
266.  Id. § 1798.82(h). 
267.  Id. § 1798.82(h)(1). 
268.  Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(A). 
269.  Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(B). 
270.  CIV. § 1798.82(h)(1)(C). 
271.  Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(D). 
272.  Id. § 1798.82(h)(1)(E). 
273.  Id. § 1798.82(h)(2). 
274.  See supra Part IV (noting the circuit split over standing in data breach litigation). 
275.  See Mank, supra note 53, at 1365 (stating Congress could pass a law providing better remedies for 
data breach litigants). 
276.  See VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 1–2 (2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42843.pdf 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing the process legislation must go through to 
become law). 
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and interested parties publicly discuss the bill’s provisions, which would allow 
the statute to best reflect the realities of privacy and database security.277 
A Supreme Court ruling would apply a single standing test to all data breach 
defendants.278 This could prove harmful for small businesses that may lack 
resources to take the protective measures instituted by larger companies.279 Thus, 
the statute would limit liability for individuals and small business owners.280 By 
limiting liability for smaller businesses, the statute would encourage these 
businesses to guard against data breaches while not being overly burdensome.281 
In addition to resolving the standing question, the law could address 
remedies as well.282 Affected individuals may take protective measures against 
data breaches, such as freezing their credit or signing up for credit monitoring 
services.283 Therefore, affected people may have to spend money to protect 
against identity theft and fraud.284 Recognizing these costs, the statute would 
provide individuals affected by a data breach the opportunity to freeze their credit 
free of charge with credit bureaus.285 The business controlling the database, such 
as Neiman Marcus in the Remijas case, would pay for the credit freezes.286 Thus, 
the statute would provide a measure of compensation to those impacted by data 
breaches without resort to the courts.287 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
Data breaches are an increasingly common occurrence and can lead to 
 
277.  See id. at 3–4 (stating committees may hold hearings on bill in which the interested parties may 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the bill). 
278.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013) (noting the discussion of the 
“certainly impending” test and “substantial risk” test). 
279.  See Andrew Zaleski, Congress Addresses Cyberwar on Small Businesses: 14 Million Hacked Over 
Last 12 Months, CNBC (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/05/congress-addresses-cyberwar-on-
small-business-14-million-hacked.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting small 
businesses often cannot afford to have IT departments). 
280.  Supra Part V.B. 
281.  See supra Part V.B (proposing a statute which would limit liability for small businesses). 
282.  See Mank, supra note 53, at 1365 (stating Congress could pass a law providing better remedies for 
data breach litigants). 
283.  Brian Fung, After the Equifax Breach, Here’s How to Freeze Your Credit to Protect Your Identity, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/09/after-the-
equifax-breach-heres-how-to-freeze-your-credit-to-protect-your-identity/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
284.  See Kayleigh Kulp, Credit Monitoring Services May Not Be Worth the Cost, CNBC (Nov. 30, 
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/credit-monitoring-services-may-not-be-worth-the-cost.html (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting credit monitoring services can cost $30 a month). 
285.  Supra Part V.B; Irby, supra note 264.         
286.  Supra Part V.B. 
287.  See id. (proposing a statute under which individuals and businesses controlling databases would pay 
for credit freezes for affected individuals in the event of a data breach). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50 
451 
consequences, including identity theft and fraud.288 Like all other plaintiffs, 
individuals attempting to sue for a data breach in federal court must have 
suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing.289 In data breach cases, plaintiffs 
may try to sue on the basis of the increased risk of identity theft due to identity 
theft not yet occurring.290 However, whether this is a sufficient injury may 
depend on which court hears the lawsuit.291 
Circuit courts have continued to diverge over whether the future risk of 
identity theft is sufficient for standing purposes.292 However, courts finding the 
future risk sufficient take the better approach because criminals hack databases to 
sell the stolen personal information or use it to commit other crimes; therefore, 
the risk of identity theft is not speculative.293 Thus, the Supreme Court should 
adopt a rule that the future risk of identity theft or fraud due to a data breach is a 
sufficient injury for standing.294 
Alternatively, Congress could resolve the data breach standing issue with a 
statute.295 A data breach law would have certain advantages over a Supreme 
Court decision, such as the flexibility to compensate affected individuals before a 
lawsuit.296 With either the Supreme Court issuing a decision or Congress passing 
a statute, the circuit split would finally end and give certainty to data breach 
plaintiffs and defendants.297 
 
 
288.  Supra Part I. 
289.  Supra Part II. 
290.  Supra Part I. 
291.  Supra Part II. 
292.  Supra Part IV. 
293.  Supra Part IV.C. 
294.  Id. 
295.  Supra Part V. 
296.  Supra Part V.C. 
297.  See supra Part II; Part IV (noting how similar data breach plaintiffs may experience different 
outcomes based on the court). 
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